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Abstract
From a theoretical viewpoint, political budget cycles (PBC) arise
in equilibrium when rational voters are imperfectly informed about the
incumbent’s competency and the incumbent enjoys discretionary power
over the budget. This paper focuses on the second condition, examining
how executive discretion is affected by the budgetary process under
separation of powers. We speciﬁcally model PBC in the composition
of government spending. The main result is that effective checks and
balances in the budgetary process curb PBC. The institutional features of
the executive-legislature bargaining game, namely, the actual agenda-setting
authority, the status quo location and the degree of legislative oversight
and control of the implementation of the budgetary law, play critical roles
for the existence and the size of PBC. These results are consistent with
recent empirical ﬁndings, which show that PBC are more pronounced
in developing countries, where there are also less effective checks and
balances.
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11 Introduction
The literature on political budget cycles (PBC) studies cycles in ﬁscal policies
generated by the electoral process. These cycles may be in the composition of
public spending, in the size of the total budget, and in the choice of taxes or debt
to ﬁnance the budget.
At a theoretical level, the literature on rational PBC has made signiﬁcant
progress analyzing informational issues.1 However, a formal analysis of PBC
under separation of powers is still lacking. In effect, in this literature it is implic-
itly assumed that ﬁscal decisions are taken unilaterally by the executive, without
any kind of institutional constraints. None of the existing models of rational PBC
has incorporated the legislature as a second player in the policy-making process
followed to set ﬁscal policy.
The assumption of concentration of powers in the hands of the executive is not
innocuous. The credibility problem this produces is at the heart of electoral cycles
in ﬁscal policy. Under separation of powers, the design of appropriate checks and
balances may provide the kind of commitment device that allows the executive
to credibly compromise to optimal policies, by requiring joint agreement in the
policy-making process.
This paper formally tackles the impact of separation of powers on PBC in the
composition of government spending, though the model can also be applied to
other aspects of ﬁscal policy. To the best of our knowledge of the ﬁeld, this is the
ﬁrst time such goal is carried out.2
As in Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990) and others, under asymmetric
information the political incumbent faces, before elections, an incentive to boost
the supply of more visible (consumption) public goods, in the hope that voters will
attribute the boost to its competence and will reelect it for another term. However,
instead of assuming an all-powerful executive, our model introduces a legislature
into the policy-making process, reﬂecting the existence of separation of powers.
Separation of powers brings into play a system of checks and balances. In this
regard, in all constitutional democracies a relatively ﬁxed and well-known proce-
dure is followed every year to draft, approve and implement the annual budget of
expenditures and the public resources to ﬁnance it.3 In this paper this procedure is
1See Shi and Svensson (2003) for a recent review.
2The interplay of various policy-makers has been considered in the analysis of the electoral
cycle in monetary policy. In Lohmann (1998a), several regional central bankers interact, while in
Drazen (2001) there is both a ﬁscal authority and a monetary authority.
3Alesina and Perotti (1995) review the literature on budget processes and institutions. Empiri-
cally, Alesina et al. (1999) point out that budget institutions have a signiﬁcant role for explaining
the cross-country variance of ﬁscal experiences in Latin America. However, this literature does
not relate budget institutions to rational PBC.
2depicted through a simple bargaining game between the executive and the legisla-
ture, which relies ultimately on the agenda-setter model of Romer and Rosenthal
(1978, 1979).4 Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) use a similar framework to
analyze separation of powers, but as a mechanism to control the rents politicians
appropriate from being in ofﬁce.
Our main result is that effective checks and balances in the budgetary pro-
cess curb PBC. Institutional features of the executive-legislature bargaining game,
namely, the actual agenda-setting authority, the status quo location and the degree
of the legislative oversight and control of the implementation of the budgetary
law, play critical roles for the existence and magnitude of electoral cycles in ﬁscal
policy.
From an empirical viewpoint, the analysis carried out in this paper may be
useful to understand why political ﬁscal cycles tend to be more pronounced in
developing countries and, particularly, in new democracies.5 While not focusing
on separation of powers and budget institutions, recent empirical evidence has
shown that many aspects of the political system (namely, electoral rules, forms of
government, level of democracy, degree of electoral competitiveness, information
and transparency, and voters’ previous experience with electoral politics) have a
signiﬁcant impact over ﬁscal cycles. Furthermore, Schuknecht (1996) also sug-
gests that there should be more room for ﬁscal manipulation in developing coun-
tries because checks and balances are usually weaker in those countries. This last
connection between the political process and PBC is precisely the one that we
formally explore in this work.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The equilib-
rium analysis is carried out in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 brieﬂy summarizes the
main results and outlines directions for future research.
2 The model
Consider an inﬁnite-horizon society composed by a large but ﬁnite number of
identical individuals, labeled i = 1, 2,...,n. Let t denote time, t ∈ T ≡ T1 ∪T2,
where T1 is the set of all odd positive integers (electoral periods) and T2 is the set
of all even positive integers (post-electoral periods).
In every period t ∈ T, individual i plays roles both as a consumer and as
a citizen. The representative consumer derives utility from two types of public
goods, whichdifferinthetimingoftheirproduction: avisible(consumption)good
gt ∈ <+, instantaneously supplied, and a less visible (capital) good kt+1 ∈ <+,
4See Rosenthal (1990) for a survey on this literature.
5See, for example, Shi and Svensson (2002a, 2002b), Persson and Tabellini (2002, 2003) and
Brender and Drazen (2003).
3provided at the end of period t. The capital good cannot be observed until it is in
place.
To simplify the equilibrium characterization, it is assumed that the represen-
tative consumer’s per-period payoff is given by a Cobb-Douglas utility function
u : <+ × <+ → <,
u(gt, kt+1) = (gt)
α (kt+1)
1−α, (1)
where 0 < α < 1.
In each period t ∈ T, the economy is subject to the budget constraint
γt + κt = τ, (2)
where γt, κt ∈ <+ denote actual budget expenditures on consumption and capital
goods, respectively, and τ ∈ <++ is a ﬁxed sum of tax revenues (the size of the
public sector).
The production of public goods is such that the same amount of per-period
public resources can be transformed into either one unit of gt or one unit of kt+1.
Their effective provision is affected by a random variable θt that represents the
competence of the executive, the agent in charge of this task. Public goods are
thus given by
gt = θt γt, (3)
kt+1 = θt κt. (4)
As in Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990) and others, actual competence
is assumed to be partially lasting, following a ﬁrst-order moving average process
(MA(1)),
θt = ¯ θ + εt + εt−1, (5)
where ε is a random iid variable and εt denotes the period t realization of ε. The
interpretation of these competence shocks is that, although competence is in prin-
ciple persistent, it comprises multiple dimensions that are not necessarily corre-
lated. The speciﬁc challenges a government faces change exogenously over time,
making actual competence contingent to these changes.







pected value E(ε) = 0 and density function ξ > 0. A higher value of ε cor-
responds to a more competent politician, since the same per-period tax revenues
can be used to provide more of both public goods. The marginal (conditional on
εt−1) probability distribution of θt, ˜ F(θt) = F(θt|εt−1), is also uniform, with sup-
port Θt =
h
¯ θ + εt−1 − 1
2ξ, ¯ θ + εt−1 + 1
2ξ
i
, ˜ F 0 > 0 for all θt ∈ Θt, ˜ F
00 = 0, and
Et−1(θt) = ¯ θ + εt−1. Henceforth, it is assumed that ¯ θ > 1/ξ, so θt > 0 and (3)
and (4) are well-deﬁned.
42.1 Separation of powers
In contrast to much of the theoretical literature on PBC, in this paper the policy-
making process carried out to set the mix of public expenditures involves the in-
teraction of two political agents, labeled E and L. These agents are the current
leaders, or incumbents, of the two branches of government, the executive and the
legislature.
In each branch, a leader’s term lasts two periods. Every other period, a random
iid recognition rule ˆ L : T1 → {1, 2 ...,n} selects a new leader for the legislature
from the set of all possible political candidates, which coincides here with the set
of citizens.6 On the other hand, the electorate removes or conﬁrms the executive
leader in an explicit electoral contest. If the executive incumbent is conﬁrmed, it
controls this branch for another term. Otherwise, a new policy-maker is randomly
recognized according to the rule ˆ E : T1 → {1, 2,...,n}. No limit is set on the
number of times incumbents can run for reelection.
Incumbents’ payoffs are as follows. They receive, like other citizens, utility
from the consumption of public goods. They also receive an exogenous rent χ > 0
at the beginning of each term in ofﬁce (i.e., in post-electoral periods), reﬂecting
the satisfaction from being in power. These rents will be the source of conﬂict
between the incumbents and the electorate. In Lohmann’s (1998b) words, this
variable reﬂects the strength of the electoral goal.
2.2 Checks and balances
The process for setting the budgetary mix under separation of powers involves a
speciﬁc system of checks and balances. At the stage of budget formulation and ap-
proval, the institutional arrangement gives E the right to make a budget allocation
proposal, but it requires the motion to be accepted by L. If no amendment rights
exist, L faces a take-it-or-leave-it proposal, where the reversion outcome ¯ γ (the
status quo) in case of rejection is exogenously speciﬁed. The legislature might be
allowed to amend the executive’s proposal, but then the amended proposal can be
vetoed by E.7
At the implementation stage, the executive supplies the public goods, but it
is monitored by the legislature. An exogenous proportion δ ∈ [0,1] of e κt, the
expenditures approved for the provision of the public capital good, cannot be re-
assigned. The interpretation is that these resources represent public funds affected
6To simplify the analysis, neither the legislative electoral process nor the citizens’ individual
decision of entering into the political arena are modeled.
7The possibility that L overrides E’s veto, not considered here, is trivial to analyze. However,
this is an unlikely case, since it usually requires that the majority leader L in the legislature have a
qualiﬁed majority to impose its criterion when E vetoes an amendment.
5to speciﬁc ends, whose realizations are subject to the revision and control of the
legislature. Thus, the executive leader can at most reassign an amount (1 − δ)e κt
of resources to the provision of gt. The measure δ determines the effective limits
the legislature imposes on the executive ofﬁce.8
2.3 Asymmetric information
In each period t ∈ T, incumbents do not observe the value of εt before making
budget allocation decisions. This assumption simply implies that, ex-ante, they
are uncertain about how well they will be able to transform government revenues
into public output.
As to the electorate V , it does not observe neither the executive leader’s most
recent competence shock, εt, nor the allocation (γt,κt) before voting.9 The only
information it receives is the amount of the consumption good gt that is provided.
Thus, incumbents have a temporary information advantage over the actual budget
allocation implemented. All past competence shocks, as well as the amount of
tax revenues, are common knowledge. Finally, even though voters do not observe
the particular circumstances incumbents confront at a given date, they know the
incentives they face and the objectives they try to achieve.
2.4 The game
Given the MA(1) process for competence, the inﬁnite-horizon model described
above can be broken down into a sequence of two-period sequential games, in
which each election is independently analyzed. Consider one of these games,
which will be referred to as G. Call t and t + 1 its two periods, such that t ∈ T1
and t + 1 ∈ T2. The set of players of G are the two incumbents, E and L, the
representative voter, V , and Nature.10
8Notice that the legislature is endowed with the power to guarantee some speciﬁc items will
be supplied, but not to prevent the over-provision of other public goods. It will be clear below that
incumbents confronted with electoral contests refrain from transferring resources from gt to kt+1.
The reason is only the provision of the more visible (consumption) goods will be effective for the
incumbent’s purpose of appearing talented to voters before elections.
9It is also assumed that V knows two parameters of the budget process, ¯ γ and δ. Below, we
discuss qualitatively how the baseline results change if these variables of the budget process are
not observed by V . In that case, the estimated value of γt will be a function of the estimated values
of ¯ γ and δ.
10Two comments are in order. First, since individuals are identical, there is no loss of generality
in using a single representative voter. Second, the two potential incumbents ˆ E(t) and ˆ L(t) should
formally be included in the set of players. However, since these players (potentially) participate
only in the last period of the game, and the optimal strategies of all incumbents at this post-
electoral period are the same, the distinction between them and the original incumbents will be
6Let Γ = [0, τ] ⊂ <+ be the set of feasible expenditures on the public con-






for each s ∈ {t, t + 1}, λ
E
s = (˜ γE
s , dE
s , γs), where 11
• ˜ γE
s : Γ → Γ is E’s budget allocation proposal, which is a function of the
status quo ¯ γ ∈ Γ;
• dE
s : {0, 1} × Γ × Γ → {0,1} is E’s veto decision rule, which depends
on L’s approval or rejection of ˜ γE
s , L’s amended proposal ˜ γL
s in case of
rejection (to be speciﬁed below) and ¯ γ; and,
• γs : Γ × [0,1] → Γ denotes actual expenditures on gs, which depends on
effective legislative oversight and control δ ∈ [0,1] and authorized expen-
ditures ˜ γs ∈ Γ (yet to be deﬁned).












s : Γ × Γ → {0,1} is L’s veto decision rule, given ˜ γE
s and ¯ γ; and,
• ˜ γL
s : Γ × [0,1] → Γ(˜ γE) is an amendment rule, as a function of ¯ γ and δ,
where Γ(˜ γE) ⊆ Γ ∪ {∅} represents the set of feasible amendments to ˜ γE
s .
For simplicity, the analysis will focus on two extreme cases where Γ(˜ γE)
does not depend on ˜ γE
s : (i) Closed rule: Γ(˜ γE) = ∅ and (ii) Open rule:
Γ(˜ γE) = Γ.
Finally, in order to decide its vote, V compares the ﬂow of payoffs expected under
each of the potential executive incumbents. Let θ
e
t ≡ Et[θt| gt] denote voters’
expectations, based on observable information. In electoral period t the voter
behaves according to the forward-looking voting rule λ






V = 1 represents V ’s decision to keep the current executive incumbent in
ofﬁce, while λ
V = 0 is vote to replace it, and v(γs, θs) ≡ u[θsγs, θs(τ − γs)] is
the indirect utility function, for s ∈ {t, t + 1}.
omitted. This simpliﬁes the notation considerably.
11In an slight abuse of notation, λ
E
t+1 is used to denote both a (conditional on being reelected)
strategy for E at t + 1 and a possible plan of action for the (potential) executive incumbent ˆ E(t).
This simpliﬁcation is also adopted below for L’s strategies. It entails no loss of generality, because
all incumbents choose the same optimal strategy in the last period of the game.
12The restriction of λ
V to pure strategies (to a yes or no vote) makes sense in large populations,
since it may be unrealistic to assume that voters coordinate on implementing a strategy that makes
reelection random from the point of view of the executive incumbent.
7For each j ∈ {E, L, V }, let Λj denote player j’s set of pure strategies. A
pure strategy proﬁle in G is a vector λ = (λ
E, λ
L, λ




























































where β ∈ (0,1) is a common discount factor and µj
s is the probability incumbent












In each period s ∈ {t, t + 1}, the timing of events is as follows:
1. E proposes ˜ γE
s to L.
2. L observes ˜ γE
s and
(a) (i) If Γ(˜ γE) = ∅, L chooses whether to accept ˜ γE





(b) (ii) If Γ(˜ γE) = Γ, L decides whether to amend ˜ γE
s or not. If it is
modiﬁed, E chooses whether to veto ˜ γL





3. E implements γs, which may differ from plan ˜ γs if δ < 1, and κs is deter-
mined residually.
4. εs is realized and gs and ks+1 are determined according to (3) and (4);
5. V observes gs, but not ks+1, nor εs and (γs, κs);
86. If s = t, ˆ L chooses a new legislative leader for the next political term. Si-
multaneously, V decides whether to vote for E or not. If E is reelected,
it stays in ofﬁce for two more periods. If not, ˆ E chooses a new executive
leader, whose competence at t+1 is determined by Nature from the proba-
bility distribution of ε;
7. Individuals observe ks+1 and period s ends.
Since this game is not of perfect information, the equilibrium concept used
to solve it is (weak) perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies. This
equilibrium concept involves an explicit description of players’ beliefs, which
must be statistically consistent with the strategy proﬁle, as well as the optimality
requirement that, given these beliefs, agents must choose a best response to the
other players’ strategies. More precisely,
Deﬁnition: A pure strategy equilibrium for G is a proﬁle of strategies






) and a belief for competence θ
e
t, which are all common
knowledge, such that, in G or any continuation game of G,
• Given ˆ λ
−j
and the speciﬁed belief θ
e








t ≡ Et[θt | gt] is determined using Bayes rule and ˆ λ on the equilibrium
path; off the equilibrium path, it is determined by the condition that unex-
pectedly low values of gt correspond to minimum competence, while unex-
pectedly high values of gt correspond to maximum competence.
3 Equilibrium analysis
This section analyzes the effects of different institutional arrangements over the
size of the electoral cycle in the composition of public expenditures. It starts by
considering the case without elections.
3.1 Benchmark
Suppose no electoral contest is held. That is, assume a unique individual is ran-
domly selected at the beginning of period t, after which it controls both the exec-
utive and the legislature. Let ∆ = |γt+1−γt| denote the size of the electoral cycle
on budget expenditures γ.
9Remark 1 If there are no elections, then every period equilibrium expenditures
are given by γ∗ = α τ and κ∗ = (1 − α) τ. Hence, electoral cycle ∆∗ = 0.
This is the social planner’s solution, which is obtained in the usual way.
3.2 One policy-maker
Assume now an electoral contest takes place at date t. One can assume that only
one policy-maker I (= E = L) exists, or that the result of the legislative electoral
process, represented by ˆ L(t), is perfectly correlated with the outcome of the pres-
idential election. This situation corresponds to the usual situation analyzed in the
literature on rational PBC, which we denote “uniﬁcation of powers”. Then, we
have the following result:13
Proposition 1 Suppose there is uniﬁcation of powers. There is a unique pure
strategy equilibrium ˆ λ
u
in G such that γu
t+1 = γ∗, γu
t > γ∗ is implicitly deﬁned by












V = 1 if and only if θ
e
t = gt/γe
t ≥ ¯ θ + εt−1.
Corollary 1 There is an electoral cycle, ∆u > 0; and ∆u is strictly increasing in
both χ and β.
The proofs of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 are as follows. First of all, notice
that our treatment of the inﬁnite-horizon game as a sequence of two-period games
is well-deﬁned, since each individual game is uncorrelated with any other member
ofthesequence. Toillustratethis, considerforexampletheexpectedutilityofV at
the post-electoral period t+3. By voting rule (6), this determines V ’s vote at t+2.
However, since competence follows a MA(1) process, V ’s expected utility at t+3
is not affected by E’s competence at t + 1: Et+1[θt+3| θt+1] = Et+1[θt+3] = ¯ θ.
Therefore, period t+1 in G is independent of the continuation game. This implies
I has no incentives to manipulate V ’s perception of its competence at t + 1 and,
consequently, that actual expenditures on gt+1 are γu
t+1 = γ∗
t+1.
Consider now electoral period t. From voter preferences (1) and γu
t+1, max-
imization of expected utility in (6) implies that V votes for I if and only if the
expected competency of I is larger than the opposition’s. Given that the only
information on potential replacement is average competency, while voters’ expec-
tations about I’s competency are given by θ
e
t ≡ Et[θt| gt], Et[θt+1| λ
V = 1] ≥
Et[θt+1| λ
V = 0] if and only if θ
e
t − εt−1 ≥ ¯ θ.
13The superscript u stands for equilibrium values under “uniﬁcation of powers”.




t be the solution, expected by V , of the incumbent’s optimization prob-




t = Et[θt | gt] =
Z
θt∈Θt















The probability I attaches to being in ofﬁce in period t+1, µI
t+1, is as follows.
By (3) and (14), θ
e
t ≥ ¯ θ + εt−1 if and only if θt ≥
(¯ θ+εt−1)γe
t
γt . Using (10),
µ
I
t+1(γt) = 1 − ˜ F
 











α (τ − γt)





















In equilibrium, γt = γe
t, since actual and expected decisions coincide. Denote
equilibrium γt ≡ γu









t − ατ) = β χ ˜ F
0
. (18)
Notice that the right hand side in (18) is positive. Thus, (γu
t − ατ) > 0, which
means γu
t > ατ = γ∗
t and κu
t < (1 − α)τ = κ∗







2. Finally, uniqueness of γu
t follows from the strict concavity of both
(15) and (16).
AstotheproofofCorollary1, theﬁrstpartisimmediatelyderivedfromPropo-
sition 1. With respect to the second part, to see that ∆u is strictly increasing in
χ, notice ﬁrst that ∂∆u/∂χ = ∂γu
t/∂χ. Therefore, totally differentiating the ﬁrst

















t ) + 1
i,
14Since I does not observe its competence before choosing the expenditure composition, γe
t
cannot depend on θt.


















t ) + 1
i,
is also positive. This complete the proof.
Thus, under the assumption of uniﬁcation of powers (only one policy-maker),
our model predicts optimal equilibrium policy during off-electoral periods, and
public consumption expenditures above the optimal level during electoral peri-
ods. These results are pretty standard, having to do with the MA(1) nature of
competency shocks.
The intuition for the result in the post-electoral period is clear. Since repu-
tation of competence lasts only one period, there is no incentive to distort ﬁscal
policy at t + 1. But, why is it that the optimal allocation at date t cannot be sus-
tained in equilibrium? Ultimately, both V and I would be better off with budget
allocation γ∗ instead of γu. The crucial point to understand this is to see that I
cannot credible compromise to follow γ∗ during electoral periods. If such policy
were expected by V , then I would have an incentive to exploit its discretionary
powertodeviatetoγu, sincesuchdeviationwouldincreaseitsprobabilityofbeing
reelected. Hence, this cannot be part of an equilibrium. In each electoral period
the incumbent trades-off the efﬁciency cost of distorting the composition of pub-
lic expenditures against a higher probability of winning the contest. Its incentive
to appear competent before elections induces overspending on the more visible
(consumption) good, at the expense of the less visible (investment) good.15
In models of PBC à la Lohmann, where policy choices are made before the
competence shock is realized, the credibility problem depicted above is at the
heart of the electoral distortion of ﬁscal policy. This policy bias is similar to the
bias generated by credibility problems in the time consistency literature, such as
the inﬂation bias in the Barro-Gordon model.16
Following the institutional solutions suggested by this literature, like the del-
egation of monetary policy to a conservative central banker, the next section will
examine whether the credibility problem of our model can be alleviated by re-
stricting the executive’s capacity of unilateral moves. The reason to do this is that
15Notice that, even though the policy bias in electoral periods reduces voters’ welfare, there is
a positive selection effect after elections, because elections help to select candidates with above-
average competency for ofﬁce. Hence the net effect may be positive or negative (Lohmann 1998b).
16The Barro-Gordon model assumes that commitment is achieved if policy is decided before
expectations, instead of being set simultaneously or afterwards. In our model, this is not enough
to achieve commitment because of asymmetric information on the actual budget allocation: in
electoral period t, high gt may be due either to high competency, or to an electoral manipulation
of budget allocation that implies low kt+1 in the future.
12the lack of credibility and the electoral bias are in fact produced by concentra-
tion of powers, which allows the all-powerful executive to choose any policy it
desires. Instead, when there exists separation of powers, we will show that ap-
propriate checks and balances, by requiring joint agreement in the policy-making
process, provide the kind of commitment device that allows E to credible com-
promise to optimal policies. Therefore, it could be that, under this institutional
arrangement, all players are made better off, including the executive incumbent.
3.3 Two policy-makers
This section incorporates a second policy-maker, the legislature, into the model,
as well as the institutional structure of checks and balances discussed in Section
2. The main purpose is to analyze how the results of the previous section change
after these modiﬁcations are introduced.
We ﬁrst consider the case of perfect compliance with the budget law, before in-
troducing the consequences of imperfect compliance. The point of this distinction
is that what matters for PBC is not nominal checks and balances, but rather the
effective checks and balances. Two variants of the system of checks and balances
are considered in each case, depending on whether Γ(˜ γE) = ∅ or Γ(˜ γE) = Γ.
3.3.1 Perfect compliance
This case corresponds to δ = 1, and represents a situation where there is perfect
legislative oversight and no enforcement problems. In other words, it is the case
in which the budget law approved through the budgetary process is the policy
implemented by the executive.
Closed rule: Assume no amendments can be made to the executive’s proposal.
That is, following the jargon of the legislative bargaining literature, suppose there
exists a closed rule, so that the legislature faces each period a take-it-or-leave-it
allocation proposal, with the rejection followed by the exogenous reversion point
(¯ γ, ¯ κ).
For j ∈ {E, L}, let ˜ πj(·) denote player j’s policy preferences over Γ, with
ideal policy γj = argmax
γ ˜ πj(γ).17 Deﬁne the function rj : Γ → Γ as follows:
∀ γ0 ∈ [0, γj], set rj(γ
0) = γ
00 if there exists γ




0) = τ otherwise. Similarly, ∀ γ
0 ∈ [γj, τ], ﬁx rj(γ
0) = γ
00 if
17The ideal policy of each incumbent is the policy it would choose if it were not constrained by
the requirement that its proposal has to be approved by the other policy-maker.
13there exists γ
00 ∈ [0, γj] such that ˜ πj(γ
0) = ˜ πj(γ
00), and rj(γ
0) = 0 otherwise.
Then, we have the following result:18
Proposition 2 Suppose there is separation of powers and the legislature cannot
amend the executive’s proposal. With perfect budgetary compliance, there exists
a unique pure strategy equilibrium ˆ λ
s



















¯ γ, rL(¯ γ)
o








V = 1 if and only if θ
e
t = gt/γe
t ≥ ¯ θ + εt−1.
Corollary 2 Except in the case where ¯ γ = γ∗, there is an electoral cycle with the
following properties:




, then ∆∗ ≤ ∆s < ∆u; 19




∪ [γu, τ], then ∆s = ∆u.
To prove Proposition 2, consider ﬁrst the post-electoral period t+1. Following
the argument applied in Proposition 1, it is immediate to note that the incumbents
implement their common most-preferred policy γ∗. No agent can be made better
off by unilateral deviations.
Going back to the electoral period t, the problem for V is still to estimate the
competence of E, Et[θt| gt], after having observed gt. As in the previous section,





t+1 has the same
form as (15).
However, γt is now determined in a non-trivial bargaining process between
the executive and the legislature, instead of being unilaterally set by E. Under the
closed rule, E has maximum power in the bargaining game. Therefore, it can be
conjectured that L will be nailed to its status quo payoff. Based on this conjecture,
the process is solved in the following way. Consider ﬁrst incumbents’ preferences









v(γt, θt) + β
h
v(γ





18The superscript s stands for equilibrium values under “separation of powers”.
19Notice that ∆s = ∆∗ only if ¯ γ = γ∗.
14It is immediate to see that ˜ πj is single-peaked on Γ, with ideal policies γL = γ∗






































































































































In order to pass a proposal ˜ γE
t , E has to guarantee L at least its reservation
payoff ˜ πL(¯ γ), to persuade it not to reject ˜ γE
t . That is, the executive’s proposal has




t ) ≥ ˜ π
L(¯ γ). (20)
Therefore, the problem of E at date t is to choose ˜ γE
t in order to maximize ˜ πE(γt)
subject to (20) and (15). Looking at Figure 1, it is clear that only two cases are
possible. If ¯ γ ∈ [0, rL(γu)] ∪ [γu, τ], then (20) is not binding, since ˜ πL(γu) >
˜ πL(¯ γ) for all ¯ γ 6= γu. That is, the reversion outcome is too low or too high, so
that L is unable to affect the equilibrium budgetary policy ˜ γs
t, by triggering E to
refuse its proposal. V anticipates this and expects E will obtain in equilibrium
authorized expenditures ˜ γs
t = γu. Therefore, the same reasoning of Section 3.2
applies.
On the other hand, if ¯ γ ∈ (rL(γu), γu), then ˜ γs
t will be above γ∗, but below
γu (except, of course, in case when ¯ γ = γ∗). Concretely, since L would reject any
other proposal that violates (20), E ties L to its status quo payoff by proposing
20Single-peakedness follows from the strict concavity of Et[v(γt, θt)] and µE
t+1(γt). We are
considering policy actions that are not constrained by the requirement that they be accepted by the
other policy-maker. While L cannot affect its probability of reelection, E takes into account the
trade-off between the probability of reelection and the current cyclical distortion.
15˜ γE
t = max{¯ γ, rL(¯ γ)}. It will never offer more than that, since this proposal
makes L indifferent between either accepting it or rejecting it and getting the
default payoff. That is, L could not be strictly better off by rejection. Hence,
dL
t = 1.
In both cases, rationality of expectations implies the optimal solution of E
coincides with V ’s expected equilibrium policy. Finally, notice that ˜ γE
t will be
lower, the closer ¯ γ is to γ∗. In effect,
∂˜ γE
t
∂¯ γ ≥ 0 for all ¯ γ ≥ γ∗ and
∂˜ γE
t
∂¯ γ < 0 for
¯ γ < γ∗.
In words, Proposition 2 says that separation of powers moderates electoral
cycles for intermediate reversion levels (i.e., for ¯ γ ∈ (rL(γu), γu)), but not for
extreme levels, where cycles are just like under uniﬁcation of powers.
Open rule: Suppose now the legislature can introduce any amendment into the
executive’s proposal, but the executive has veto power over it. Under this institu-
tional structure, the role of each incumbent is in fact reversed. That is, L becomes
the actual agenda-setter, while E reduces to a veto player. The main result is the
following:
Proposition 3 Suppose there is separation of powers and the legislature can in-
troduce any amendment into the executive’s proposal. With perfect budgetary
compliance, there exists a unique pure strategy equilibrium ˆ λ
s



















¯ γ, rE(¯ γ)
o




V = 1 if and only if θ
e
t = gt/γu
t ≥ ¯ θ.
Corollary 3 Except in the case where ¯ γ = γu
t, the electoral cycle is dampened or
eliminated by separation of powers:








, then ∆s = ∆∗;
2. If ¯ γ ∈ (γ∗, rE(γ∗)), then ∆∗ < ∆s ≤ ∆u.
To derive Proposition 3, the analysis is similar to Proposition 2. The equi-
librium at the post-electoral period t + 1 and the optimal response of V to the
observation of gt are exactly the same.
With respect to the bargaining process carried out at period t, the only differ-
ence is who has the effective power to make ﬁnal offers. Here the actual agenda-
setter is the legislative leader, instead of the executive incumbent. It will be clear
16below that this reduces considerably the electoral distortion on γt, compared with
a closed rule, since it curtails E’s power over the budget composition.
For ¯ γ ∈ [0, γ∗]∪[rE(γ∗), τ], the legislature’s leader would amend any execu-
tive proposal ˜ γE
t 6= γ∗ by setting ˜ γL
t = γ∗. This amendment satisﬁes the incentive
constraint ˜ πE(˜ γL
t ) ≥ ˜ πE(¯ γ) (see Figure 1). Therefore, it cannot be vetoed by E.
Understanding this, E weakly prefers to make such an offer rather than to propose
a different spending level and lose approval in the legislature.
A similar reasoning can be made if ¯ γ ∈ (γ∗, rE(γ∗)). However, in this case γ∗
does not satisfy the incentive constraint of E. That is, ˜ πE(γ∗) < ˜ πE(¯ γ). There-
fore, L cannot achieve its ideal policy γ∗. Nevertheless, following the logic of




¯ γ, rE(¯ γ)
o
. Hence, this policy is proposed in equilibrium
and ∆∗ < ∆s ≤ ∆u, being ∆s = ∆u only if ¯ γ = γu.
In words, Proposition 3 says that, when there exists open rule, separation of
powers completely eliminates the electoral cycles on γt for low and high reversion
levels. On the contrary, for intermediate values of ¯ γ, the electoral cycle in public
consumption expenditures cannot be eliminated, but its magnitude is reduced.
Notice that for low and high values of ¯ γ, the results with and without amend-
ments are exactly the opposite. While the former provides the ﬁrst best allocation,
the second supplies the same predictions as uniﬁcation of powers. The explana-
tion for this is based on who is the actual veto player in each case, and by the fact
that the veto player has greatest power when the reversion policy is very near its
most-preferred policy.
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 2 and 3 for different status quo. In the case of
closed rule, ˜ γs
t starts at γu, for ¯ γ = 0, then it eventually starts falling, reaching γ∗
as ¯ γ approaches γ∗, and then it starts rising again to γu. The graph has the inverse
shape in the case of open rule, starting at γ∗, then rising towards γu, and reaching
it when ¯ γ = γu, before starting to fall again. This behavior of ˜ γs
t explains the









































































































































We analyze in this section the general case δ ∈ [0,1], allowing for the existence
of either imperfect oversight or enforcement of the budget law or both. This cap-
tures the situation where the policy approved through the budgetary process is not
necessarily the policy implemented by the executive.
Closed rule: Imperfect compliance at the implementation stage makes actual
electoral expenditures γs
t greater than approved ones ˜ γs
t. The legislature takes
this into account in the budget process, so this breaks the indifference of L in
Proposition 2 between rL(¯ γ) and ¯ γ.
18Proposition 4 If there is separation of powers and closed rule, then there exists
a unique pure strategy equilibrium ˆ λ
s
























t = min {γ




V = 1 if and only if θ
e
t = gt/γe




τ−˜ γs(¯ γ) be the critical level of compliance that makes the ﬁrst
term of the right hand side of (23) equal to the second.
Corollary 4 Electoral cycles depend on the status quo and the degree of compli-
ance:
1. If δ > δ




, then ∆∗ ≤ ∆s(¯ γ, δ) < ∆u;
2. If either δ ≤ δ




∪ [γu, τ], then ∆s(¯ γ, δ) = ∆u;
3. Given ¯ γ ∈ [0, τ], ∆s(¯ γ, δ) is non-increasing in δ ∈ [0, 1).
Lookingat(23), ifδ = 1, thenγs
t = ˜ γs




t at the critical value δ
crit(¯ γ), and staying there for lower values of
δ.
The legislature foresees that the executive will try to divert budgetary re-
sources at the implementation stage. For δ > δ
crit(¯ γ) and ¯ γ < rL(¯ γ), ¯ γ ∈ 
rL(γu), γu

, L will no longer be indifferent between ¯ γ and rL(¯ γ), since it knows
that at the implementation stage E will reallocate a part 1 − δ of any approved
budget to visible expenditure. L will prefer to restrict E to the lower level ¯ γ of
spending on visible goods. Note that spending will always be below the case of
uniﬁcation of powers, i.e. γs
t < γu
t.
Figure 3 below shows the shape of γs
t as a function of δ:
21The proof of Proposition 4 is similar to Proposition 2. The only difference is that in this case
V also anticipates the use of discretion at the implementation stage. Therefore, the actual spending






























































































































































For a status quo ¯ γ ∈ (rL(γu), γu), Figure 3a shows that γs
t coincides with E’s
ideal policy for δ ≤ δ
crit(¯ γ). For δ > δ
crit(¯ γ), γs
t decreases monotonically as δ
rises, reaching ˜ γs
t when δ = 1. Unlike Proposition 2, it reaches γ∗ not only for the
non-generic case ¯ γ = γ∗, but also for the ¯ γ ∈ (rL(γu), γ∗). Indeed, in this range
there can be underspending on visible public goods in election years.22 On the
other hand, for ¯ γ ∈ [0, rL(γu)] ∪ [γu, τ], Figure 3b shows that γs
t is completely
insensitive to the value of δ.
This discussion is formally summarized in Corollary 4. Note that point 3 of
Corollary 4 means that, for a given ¯ γ, the existence of discretion at the implemen-
22For δ = 1, ∆s(¯ γ, δ) = ∆∗ only if ¯ γ = γ∗. For 1 > δ > δ
crit(¯ γ), there is ¯ γ < γ∗ such that
the effects of both parameters just cancel out, so ∆s(¯ γ, δ) = ∆∗ too.
20tation stage reduces the moderating inﬂuence of the legislature in electoral peri-
ods. Thisdoes notmean thatimperfectcompliance alwaysleads toa largercycical
distortion than perfect compliance, because there is a discontinuity at δ = 1 in the
approved budgets. As compliance falls inﬁnitesimally, for ¯ γ ∈ (rL(γu), γ∗), L
strictly prefers the status quo ¯ γ. The end-result may be a smaller cycle (even
optimal policy) compared to perfect compliance.
Open rule: As to the case of open rule, we have the following:
Proposition 5 Ifthereisseparationofpowersandopenrule, thereexistsaunique
pure strategy equilibrium ˆ λ
s
















¯ γ, rE(¯ γ)
o





t = min {γ
u




V = 1 if and only if θ
e
t = gt/γu







Corollary 5 Electoral cycles depend on the status quo and the degree of compli-
ance:








, orδ = 1−α and ¯ γ ∈ {0, τ},
then ∆s(¯ γ, δ) = ∆∗;
2. If either δ < 1 − α or ¯ γ ∈ (b γ, rE(b γ)), then ∆∗ < ∆s(¯ γ, δ) ≤ ∆u;
3. Given ¯ γ ∈ [0, τ], ∆s(¯ γ, δ) is non-increasing in δ.
To derive Proposition 5, we must take into account that the legislature foresees
that the executive will try to divert budgetary resources at the implementation
stage. For any level of authorized expenditures ˜ γt, the policy implemented will be
γt = min {γu
t, τ − δ[τ − ˜ γs
t]}. That is, E will set γt at its most-preferred policy
or, if this were not possible, it will use at the implementation the maximum degree
of discretion to achieve an alternative as close as possible to γu.
For a given value of δ, let b γ be implicitly deﬁned by the following condition:







. It is clear that b γ > 0 if and only if δ > 1 − α, and b γ = 0
when δ ≤ 1 − α.
For δ > 1−α and ¯ γ ∈ [0, b γ]∪[rE(b γ), τ], the legislative leader would amend
any executive proposal ˜ γE
t 6= b γ by setting ˜ γL
t = b γ. As in Proposition 3, this
21amendment satisﬁes the incentive constraint ˜ πE(˜ γL
t ) ≥ ˜ πE(¯ γ) (see Figure 1).
By deﬁnition, b γ ensures the legislature its ideal policy γ∗ is realized. The same
happens if δ = 1 − α and ¯ γ ∈ {0, τ}.
On the other hand, if δ < 1 − α, there is a corner solution with b γ = 0. In
this case, b γ does not satisfy the incentive constraint of E for ¯ γ ∈ (0, τ). That
is, ˜ πE(b γ) < ˜ πE(¯ γ). Therefore, L can at most restrict player E to its reservation
utility, by amending any proposal ˜ γE
t 6= min
n
¯ γ, rE(¯ γ)
o
. Note that for ¯ γ ∈
{0, τ}, the proposal will also be ˜ γE
t = min
n
¯ γ, rE(¯ γ)
o
. Therefore, for any
level of authorized expenditures ˜ γs
t, it follows that γs
t > γ∗. Furthermore, for
δ ≤ (τ − γu
t)/τ, γs
t = γu, so ∆s(¯ γ, δ) = ∆u. Therefore, ∆∗ < ∆s(¯ γ, δ) ≤ ∆u.




¯ γ, rE(¯ γ)
o
. And by analysis above, γs
t increases as δ falls, being γs
t = γu
t
only if either δ ≤ (τ − γu
t)/τ or ¯ γ = γu (see Figure 4).
Comparing Propositions 3 and 5, one can see that the moderating force of divi-
sion of power, when there exists agenda-setting authority and open rule, decreases


















































































































































In this paper we analyze a model of PBC with asymmetric information on the
actual budget allocation. Under the standard assumption of uniﬁcation of powers,
the model predicts optimal equilibrium policy during off-electoral periods, but not
just ahead of the elections. Policy distortions in the composition of government
spending occur just before elections because the incumbent’s incentive to appear
23competent during these periods induces overspending in the public consumption
good (the more visible good), while simultaneously reduces the spending on the
public capital good below the socially optimal level.
The fact that the executive incumbent is unable to credible compromise to the
optimal allocation policy is at the heart of these electoral distortions. Furthermore,
itturnsoutthatthisproblemisinfactgeneratedbyconcentrationofpowers, which
allows the executive to choose any policy it desires. Instead, when there exists
separation of powers, appropriate checks and balances work as a commitment
device that reduces the size of political ﬁscal cycles, making all players better off
(included the executive incumbent). This moderating force depends on the details
of the bargaining game, namely the status quo location, the actual agenda-setting
authority and the degree of compliance with the budget law.
Even though we do not consider signaling models of PBC à la Rogoff, it
should be expected that separation of powers affect electoral ﬁscal cycles in a
similar way.23 The legislature basically tries to avoid distortions in the allocation
of budget resources. This should reduce the electoral distortions of ﬁscal policy,
preserving the signaling role of the provision of public goods.
What may change the results is lifting the assumption that the legislature has
no electoral stakes. In this regard, our case is the best scenario where the legisla-
ture controls the executive to try to assure the socially optimal policy is followed.
Our model might be extended to study the role of divided goverment in presi-
dential systems, as well as coalition governments in parlimentary systems. For
instance, Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) show how divided government is a tool to
moderate the executive in a presidential system. A similar logic may apply in an
opportunistic framework, where an opposition legislature may play a special role
in moderating cycles.
Finally, our model of PBC under separation of powers could also be employed
to understand how the incumbent chooses among different ﬁscal instruments or
whyit usessome ofthem morefrequentlyin somecountries thanin others.24 Even
thoughtheﬁscalpolicyincludesseveralitems, liketaxes, expenditurecomposition
23Notice that in models of PBC à la Rogoff, the timing of events is reversed in relation to
Lohmann. That is, the incumbent observes its competence before choosing the per-period policy,
not afterwards. However, the informativeness of the signal is not larger in equilibrium, since there
is a separating equilibrium with both types of models. Nevertheless, the Rogoff timing brings in
an extra complication. The signal depends on the incumbents type, something that is not required
to explain the policy bias in electoral periods. Moreover, this is also an unappealing feature, since
it implies that competent incumbents distort the most, while the utterly incompetent incumbents
do not.
24For instance, tax cuts before elections seems to be more frequent in OECD countries, while
changesoftheexpenditurecompositionandbudgetdeﬁcitsareusuallyobservedinLatinAmerican
countries. For more on that, see for example Block (2002), Persson and Tabellini (2002) and Shi
and Svensson (2002a, 2002b).
24and debt, there is no general model of rational PBC that explains how politicians
choose between these instruments. Following the logic of our model, it should
be expected that institutional details play an important role in the selection. This
is because the executive should manipulate those ﬁscal instruments where it has
greater agenda-setting authority. It is left for a future research to formally explore
this conjecture, as well as its empirical validity.
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